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CRIME COMPENSATION
Richard Cosway*
Washington has adopted a system of compensation for innocent
victims of crimes, the eleventh state to do so.' The principal charac-
teristic which distinguishes the new Washington Act from other pre-
sent and proposed programs is the connection between it and In-
dustrial Insurance, more commonly known as Workmen's Compensa-
tion. This connection has at least three significant consequences: (1)
Because the victim is equated with an on-the-job injured employee,
the amount of an individual's award is geared to the amount an in-
jured workman or dependents of a deceased workman would receive;
(2) the administration of the new program is assigned to the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries; (3) the procedures for compensating
crime victims, including a modified judicial review, generally will
follow those procedures established for settling Industrial Insurance
claims.
I. THEORY OF COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF CRIME
A. Justification for Compensation
Frequently raised questons are: "Why compensate crime victims?
How are they different from others who suffer loss through accident,
such as earthquake or storm? Indeed how are they different from
those who suffer injury through human acts which are not identified
as criminal?"'2 These kinds of questions usually are raised by oppo-
nents of crime compensation. Indeed, if the title of the Act were
changed from crime victims' reparations to tort victims' reparations,
the scheme would be foredoomed to failure. Those favoring crime
Professor of Law, University of Washington, A.B., Denison University, 1939;
J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1942.
I. Ch. 122, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.68.010-.910
(Supp. 1973).
2. The questions are explored by Professor Frank W. Miller in Miller, et al.,
Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence-A Roundtable Discussion, 8 J. PUB.
L. 191, 203 (1959), and by Walter J. Blum in Blum, Victims of Crime and Other
Victims, 52 CHICAGO B. REC. 463 (197 1).
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reparations usually have concluded a priori that the incidence of
crime is large enough and yet sporadic enough so that the losses
caused by it should be spread throughout society rather than borne by
the particular victims. 3 Other catastrophic losses could similarly be
spread, but society's inability to provide complete protection from all
losses need not deter it from providing partial protection when it is
economically and socially feasible.
Though the history of crime victims' compensation schemes may
not provide a perfect conceptual answer to their justification, it does
suggest some clues. Many historians find the source of crime victims'
compensation in the Code of Hammurabi, 2250 B.C. 4 Though inter-
esting historically, this early appearance cannot be said to be influen-
tial in modern developments. Instead, the meaningful history began in
the second half of this century in New Zealand and Great Britain. The
origins of the scheme in Great Britain, at least, suggest an organized
program for distribution of governmental largesse:"5
Compensation will be paid ex gratia. The Government does not
accept that the State is liable for injuries caused to people by the acts
of others. The public does, however, feel a sense of responsibility for
and sympathy with the innocent victim, and it is right that this feeling
should find practical expression in the provision of compensation on
behalf of the community.
The most acceptable justification for compensating crime victims is
that the state has failed to provide adequate protection from crime
and that, to the extent possible, the state should compensate those
who suffer loss through the absence of adequate protection."i This
analysis seems mandated if the scheme is to escape challenge under
provisions of the Washington Constitution prohibiting the giving away
of state monies or credit.7 Indeed, the Washington Crime Compensa-
3. For a detailed discussion, see Note. Compensation for the Criminally Injured
Revisited: An Emphasis on the Victim?, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 88 (1971).
4. See, e.g., the fine discussion in Wright, What About the Victims? Compensation
for the Victims of Crime, 48 N.D. L. REV. 473. 475 (1972).
5. HOME OFFICE AND SCOTTISHI HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT. COMPENSA IlON
FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, Cmnd. 2323 Para. 8 (1964).
6. There are several theories supporting compensation to crime victims, and the
brief discussion in this article does not pretend to do justice to the entire spectrum.
A fine discussion appears in Note, Compensation for the Criminally Injured Revisited:
An Emphasis on the Victim?, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 88 (1971).
7. WASH. CONsT. art. VIII. § 5:
CREDIT NOT TO BE LOANED. The credit of the state shall not. in any
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tion Act, more forthrightly than any other, appears to be founded on
this duty of protection, since it provides for limited payments to vic-
tims in consideration for abolishing claims against the state. The Act
provides:8
In keeping with the intent of the legislature as set forth in section 1
of this act, all civil actions and civil causes of action against the state
for injury or death as a consequence of a criminal act, and all jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the state over such causes, are hereby abolished
except as in this chapter provided.
It is doubtful, however, that any underlying liability of the state for
the criminal acts of third parties actually exists. -) Perhaps this provi-
sion reflects concern regarding the state's liability for injuries inflicted
by escaped or paroled offenders. If the provision is an admission of
liability, it may well backfire because the statutory compensation
scheme is available only to residents of this State.' 0 A nonresident
manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company
or corporation.
Id. art. XII § 9:
STATE NOT TO LOAN ITS CREDIT OR SUBSCRIBE FOR STOCK. The
state shall not in any manner loan its credit, nor shall it subscribe to. or be in-
terested in the stock of any company, association or corporation.
8. Ch. 122. § 4 11973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. Professor Lamborn says of
those systems in effect prior to Washington's: "None of the 22 jurisdictions that have
established comprehensive crime victim compensation programs has accepted the the-
ory that government has a duty to compensate victims of crime." Lamborn, The
Propriety of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 446.463 (1973).
9. In LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE, Cmnd. 1406 (1961), this view is expressed:
The proposition that the State has a duty to protect its members from unlaw-
ful violence and that if it fails to do so it should pay compensation seems to us
to be both fallacious and dangerous. Fallacious, because we do not believe that
the State has an absolute duty to protect every citizen all the time against other
citizens: there is a distinction between compensation for the consequences of
civil riot, which the force of law and order may be expected to prevent, and
compensation for injury by individual acts of personal violence, which can never
be entirely prevented. It is true . . . the public generally are prohibited from
carrying weapons to protect themselves, but it does not follow that the State has
assumed the duty of protecting them everywhere and in all circumstances; the
most it has done is to create an assumption that it will provide a general condition
of civil peace.
Some landmark decisions impose liability on the state. See Schuster v. City of
New York. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958); Fink6l V. State, 37 Misc. 2d 757.
237 N.Y.S.2d 66 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1962). However, these cases obviously involve rather
narrow, specific duties of protection and cannot be said to impose the general liability
adverted to in the British report.
10. The definition of "victim" limits the persons who suffer compensable injury
or death to residents of the state, although persons such as dependents who derive a
553
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might argue that the Legislature has admitted the existence of civil
causes of action against the state without abolishing them for nonresi-
dents. It is unclear, however, whether the duty which underlies those
causes of action runs to both residents and nonresidents of the state.
A further rationale for crime compensation plans derives from the
encouragement they give to third parties to intervene and help prevent
crimes or apprehend escaping offenders. Some federal proposals, for
example, are more generous toward intervenors than other crime vic-
tims.' I The Washington scheme shows no such partiality, but the de-
sire to encourage intervenors is reflected in the definition of "victim,"
which includes persons who sustain injury in a "good faith and rea-
sonable effort to prevent a criminal act" or in a "good faith effort to
apprehend a person reasonably suspected of engaging in a criminal
act." 12
B. Need as a Basis for Compensation
The history of crime compensation programs in other states pro-
vides a revealing glimpse into a limitation that does not exist in the
Washington plan. A few states such as California have built a welfare
concept into their crime compensation programs by providing com-
pensation only to needy victims. 13 This restriction is not consonant
with the rationale of other than an ex gratia crime victims' compensa-
tion program, because the loss sustained by the rich or middle-class
victim is as real as that sustained by the impoverished victim. 14 The
apparent explanation for a need requirement is the cost factor. Some
would argue that the desirability of limiting costs outweighs any need
to compensate a wealthy person who is criminally injured.
claim through the victim need not be residents of the State. Ch. 122. § 2(3). [19731
Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess.
1I. See, e.g., S. 383, 93d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1973): S. 2994. 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1971).
12. Ch. 122. § 2(3). 11973] Wash. Laws. 1st Ex. Sess. While reasonable minds
may differ as to the required attitude of the intervenor, a requirement of reasonableness
seems to abort the ends sought. If a bystander honestly and in good faith believes he
is preventing a crime and subsequently sustains injury, he will be surprised if he is
denied compensation because he did not act reasonably. The effect of denying com-
pensation will be to deter future intervenors for they will be reluctant to match wits
with a hindsight viewer of their conduct.
13. See Lamborn, The Scope of Programs for Governmental Compensation of
Victiros of Crine, 1973 IiL. L.F. 21, 56 [hereinafter cited as Lamborn].
14. Id. at 57.
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The perception that crime victim's reparations programs are, in
essence, designed to protect only against catastrophic losses provides
the principal argument for the need restriction. If a victim can bear
his loss without necessitating a substantial change in his life style, the
loss should be borne by him and not spread among society. However,
this "financial stress" approach is of dubious validity when the com-
pensation program is designed to be a substitute for the civil liability
of the State.'5 Thus, the absence of a financial need test in the Wash-
ington program is consistent with the program's rationale.
Nevertheless, even in Washington, the last chapter on financial
need remains to be written because of the probability of federal en-
trance into the field of crime compensation. One aspect of the proposed
federal enactment that is likely to have an impact on states is a provi-
sion that the federal government will pay a substantial share of the
cost of acceptable state plans. However, one requirement for an ac-
ceptable state plan may well be that the compensation be provided
only to alleviate financial stress. 16
Once a federal program of reimbursement is established, all states
will scurry under the umbrella by making their plans commensurate
with federal standards. However, the result where state and federal
requirements are not parallel is unclear. Perhaps none of the state's
costs will be reimbursed. More likely, only those costs incurred in
cases meeting federal standards will be reimbursed, leaving to the
state the option to provide more extensive coverage in other cases.
The gargantuan bookkeeping problems which may result in any state
not precisely copying the federal plan will provide inducement for
states to follow the federal plan. However, if a federal crime compen-
sation bill is enacted which includes a financial stress requirement,
Washington might well decide to forego the federal "manna" because
the administrative costs required to make a need determination in
each case may be greater than the benefits to be derived from federal
reimbursement.
15. See Note, What A bout the Victims? Compensation for the Victims of Crime,
48 N.D. L. REv. 473 (1972).
16. The "financial stress" requirement was incorporated into the only bill to be
passed by the Senate. See S. 300, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), analyzed in Lamborn,
The Propriety of Governm-nental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 466 (1973). Cf. H.R. 15497, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which does not
incorporate the test.
555
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C. Insurance Proceeds A vailable to the Victim
Related to the issue of financial stress or need as a sine qua non of
granting compensation is the intractable policy question of how to
deal with insurance and other compensatory proceeds available to the
victim. Is the prudent fellow who has invested $5,000 in medical care
or disability insurance to be treated differently from the fellow who
has $5,000 on deposit in a bank? If financial need is a criterion, the
answer is no, but remove that requirement and both the policy of
compensation and the words necessary to implement that policy be-
come difficult to determine.
The policy adopted by Washington is to reduce the compensation
of victims having insurance by the insurance proceeds, while pro-
viding full compensation to all other victims regardless of their finan-
cial resources.' 7 This approach is typical' 8 but difficult to justify be-
cause it discriminates between individuals on the basis of their invest-
ments. However, the better analysis which justifies the Washington
approach is that the victim ought not to be doubly compensated for
his injury, and therefore he should not receive the windfall of col-
lecting both insurance and state compensation. As between the insur-
ance company and the state, the primary loss seems a priori properly
on the company which has undertaken to insure against the risk.
II. ADMINISTRATION
With two exceptions, the states other than Washington which have
adopted programs for compensating victims of crime have entrusted
the implementation of their programs to specially created boards."
While the problems and basic philosophy of a crime victims' repara-
tions program dictate using an administrative body uninhibited by the
burdens and concepts of unrelated programs, 211 the Washington ap-
proach of entrusting administration to the Department of Labor and
Industries is certainly a worthy experiment. Undertaking the program
17. Ch. 122. § 13. 11973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess.
18. See Lamborn. supra note 13, at 65.
19. Massachusetts utilizes the court system and California has entrusted its pro-
gram to an established agency. See Brooks, Compensating Victims of Crime: The
Recommendations of Program Administrators, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 445. 446 (1973).
20. Id. at 448.
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should not be unduly burdensome on the Department; the number of
claims, at least in the early months, should be low so that a relatively
small addition to the Department's staff should be sufficient to admin-
ister the program. Entrustment of the new program to employees
within the Department who are not responsible for other Industrial
Insurance cases will protect the scheme's integrity from nuances of
workmen's compensation ill-adapted to the administration of a crime
compensation program.
The Act does not deal directly with the status of the criminal or al-
leged criminal in the compensation proceedings. While the treatment
accorded the employer in Industrial Insurance claims is specifically
made inapplicable to the Act,2 ' there is no positive articulation of the
criminal's role, if any, in crime compensation proceedings. Several
provisions of the Act support the theory that the criminal offender has
no status in the compensation proceedings and, indeed, he may not be
affected by the proceedings.
A victim's compensation is not dependent upon a criminal convic-
tion. The Act specifically provides: 22
PROVIDED FURTHER: (a) That neither an acquittal in a criminal
prosecution nor the absence of any such prosecution shall be admis-
sible in any claim or proceeding under this chapter as evidence of the
noncriminal character of the acts giving rise to such claim or pro-
ceeding; (b) that evidence of a criminal conviction arising from acts
which are the basis for a claim or proceeding under this chapter shall
be admissible in such claim or proceeding for the limited purpose of
proving the criminal character of the acts ....
The provision in subsection (a) that absence of prosecution is irrele-
vant to an award is a fairly standard provision, but the stipulation that
an acquittal in criminal proceedings does not bar an award is unusual.23
This latter clause supports the theory that awards of compensation
are not related to the criminal prosecution, which in turn leads to the
conclusion that the alleged offender has no status in the proceedings
for an award. This conclusion is bolstered by another provision which
21. Ch. 122, § II, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex.Sess.
22. Id. § 2(2).
23. No doubt the reason behind this provision is that criminal prosecutions must
meet the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, a burden not to be imposed in
compensation schemes. See Lamborn, supra note 13, at 46.
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apparently precludes the criminal defendant from inspecting the re-
cords in compensation proceedings. 24
This apparent denial of status may not adversely affect most crim-
inal offenders because evidence of awards of compensation cannot be
introduced in criminal proceedings. Though the Act does not say so,
the standard of proof required for compensation surely is not the rea-
sonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction. Thus, be-
cause of the lesser burden of proof required in compensation proceed-
ings, evidence of awards of compensation and determinations made in
the associated administrative proceedings are inadmissible in criminal
cases.
Yet, a person who is charged with a crime which forms the basis
for a compensation claim is not totally unaffected by the Act. First,
records made in compensation proceedings may be a valuable source
for criminal defendants seeking pretrial information about the prose-
cution's case.25 However, this information source is not available to
the criminal defendant in Washington unless he is a party to the
proceedings because the public is barred from access to the record.
Second, the criminal offender may be financially affected by provi-
sions of the Act respecting reimbursement to the state for funds given
to the victim. The Act provides:2 6
Sec. 5 .. .No right of action at law against a person who has com-
mitted a criminal act, for damages as a consequence of such act, shall
be lost as a consequence of receiving benefits under the provisions of
this chapter. In the event any person receiving benefits under this
chapter additionally seeks a remedy for damages from the person or
persons who have committed the criminal act resulting in damages,
then and in that event the department shall be subrogated to and have
24. Ch. 122. § 14, 119731 Wash. Laws. Ist Ex. Sess.. provides:
Information contained in the claim files and records of victims, under the
provisions of this chapter, shall be deemed confidential and shall not be open to
public inspection (other than to public employees in the performance of their
official duties), but a representative of a claimant, be it an individual or an organi-
zation. may review a claim file or receive specific information therefrom upon the
presentation of the signed authorization of the claimant.
25. Mr. Herbert Edelhertz and Professor Gilbert Geis will probably make this
suggestion in their forthcoming book, entitled PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF
CRIME (to be published in the Spring of 1974). The author is indebted to them for
their kindness in allowing him to read portions of this work which promises to become
the definitive study in the field. Another very valuable and exhaustive study is being
published by Professor Lamborn of Wayne State University in article form.
26. Ch. 122, 11973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
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a lien upon any recovery so made to the extent of the payments made
by the department to or on behalf of such persons under this chapter.
Sec. 12 . . . Any person who has committed a criminal act which
resulted in injury compensated under this chapter may be required to
make reimbursement to the department as hereinafter provided.
(1) Any payment of benefits to or on behalf of a victim under this
chapter creates a debt due and owing to the department by any person
found to have committed such criminal act in either a civil or criminal
court proceeding in which he is a party: PROVIDED, That where
there has been a superior or district court order, or an order of the
board of prison terms and paroles or the department of social and
health services, as hereinafter provided, the debt shall be limited to the
amount provided for in said order. A court order shall prevail over
any other order.
(2) Upon being placed on work release pursuant to chapter 72-65
RCW, or upon release from custody of a state correctional facility on
parole, any convicted person who owes a debt to the department as a
consequence of a criminal act may have the schedule or amount of
payments therefor set as a condition of work release or parole by the
department of social and health services or board of prison terms and
paroles respectively, subject to modification based on change of cir-
cumstances. Such action shall be binding on the department.
(3) Any requirement for payment due and owing the department by
a convicted person under this chapter may be waived, modified down-
ward or otherwise adjusted by the department in the interest of justice
and the rehabilitation of the individual.
Even though the award of compensation may be eventually
charged to an offender, he does not appear to have standing in the
compensation proceeding. The need for prompt processing of claims
is the essential reason for not giving standing to the offender, who
might block or delay awards.
In view of the Act's provision that compensation may be awarded
even though there is an acquittal of a particular offender, any crim-
inal culpability of the offender must be established in criminal pro-
ceedings. Similarly, the liability for reimbursement to the state must
be established independently of the crime compensation proceeding in
a civil or criminal proceeding in which the defendant is a party, and
any defenses to liability are to be litigated there.27 Compensation is to
27. Liability for reimbursement to the state may be determined in either a civil or
criminal proceeding in which the alleged offender is a party. Id. § 12(1). Generally,
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be awarded, in short, irrespective of the potential for reimbursement
from an offender.
III. ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION
The Washington statute allows compensation only for personal in-
jury or death.2 8 It does not compensate property damage. At the time
of the urban riots some years ago, serious attention was given to the
plight of real property owners who were not practically able to obtain
insurance. As a result, some states provided compensation to real
property owners, but this often proved quite costly.2 - Personal prop-
erty losses have generally not been covered by existing compensation
programs though provisions do exist to compensate the intervenor
whose clothing is torn or whose car is damaged. 31 Losses from em-
bezzlement and theft are to be covered, if at all, by private insurance.
Though one can imagine a blend of property damage and personal
injury, such as that once sustained by an Ohio employee whose only
loss was the fracturing of his wooden leg-no apparently critical is-
sues arise from limiting compensation to personal injury and death.
The injury or death must result from an actual or attempted felony
or misdemeanor. However, in one particular instance the Washington
plan departs from the limitation that only crimes give rise to compen-
sation. That departure relates to acts done by persons deemed incom-
petent to commit crimes. Even though the offender is not criminally
responsible, his victim may be compensated. 3 1 The result is equitable
liability will be predicated upon a criminal conviction. However. even if a criminal
conviction is not obtained, a victim may successfully prosecute a tort action. If a
civil judgment remains unsatisfied and if the tort was a criminal offense, the victim
could still seek compensation through the Crime Compensation Act. Presumably.
uch an award would create liability in the offender to the state, since he was pre-
viously a party to a civil proceeding in which he was found to have committed the
criminal act.
28. Id. § 2(3).
29. See Lamborn. stpra note 13. at 26. Some states devised schemes to provide
insurance at reasonable premiums. See Note. Riot Insturance, 77 YALE L.J. 541 (1968):
Note. Baltimore City's Liabilityv for Riot Damage: The Mayor as Conservator of
the Peace, 33 Mn. L. REv. 73 (1973). The federally funded program is authorized by
12 U.S.C. § 1749bb (Supp. II 1972).
30. See Lamborn. supra note 13. at 25. Some proposed federal bills have detailed
similar compensation. See S. 800, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
31. Ch. 122, § 2(2). [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. This provision is typical
of statutes providing for compensation to crime victims.
The Act refers to "insanity or mental irresponsibility of the perpetrator.- and it
does not refer specifically to infancy. Infancy seems to be included under "mental
560
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enough, but a mind constrained by logical consistency might well balk
at this extension.
Crimes relating solely to the operation of a motor vehicle, boat,
airplane, motorcycle or train are excluded unless used to inflict inten-
tional injury or as "part of the commission of another criminal act as
defined" in the Act.32 This exclusion is adopted by all other crime
compensation programs, and the explanation is essentially one of cost.33
A constitutional argument that no valid distinction can be drawn
between a victim injured by a carelessly handled gun and car can be ex-
pected. However, widespread availability of insurance, no-fault or
otherwise, and programs to limit the use of the roads to financially
responsible persons seem to be the basic justification for noncompen-
sation of these injuries under crime compensation programs.
The injury or death must be sustained by an "innocent" victim. 34
This requirement of innocence promises to be a source of uncertainty
until its parameters are identified. The parallel between industrial in-
surance and the Act appears to have been abandoned by inserting this
requirement, because the fault of a worker has long been excluded as
a basis for denying workmen's compensation. Even in industrial insur-
ance, however, compensation is typically denied for willfully
self-inflicted injury,35 so at least some of the outer limits of the inno-
cence requirement can be foreseen. The doctrine that may emerge
under the test of "innocent" is contributory negligence. 36 Compensa-
tion should not be denied, however, simply for negligent exposure to
irresponsibility." However, just as not all accidentally inflicted injuries perpetrated
by competent adults are criminal, neither are all accidentally inflicted injuries caused
by an incompetent necessarily compensable. Mens rea required for particular crimes
must be present in the case of the competent, and in the case of the incompetent must
be said to have been present but for the incompetency. See Rothstein, State Compen-
sation for Criminally Inflicted Injuries, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 38, 42 (1965); Lamborn,
supra note .13, at 40.
32. Ch. 122, § 2(2). [1973] Wash. Laws. ist Ex. Sess. One can imagine claims by
individuals run down by pers6ns fleeing from the scene of arsons, robberies and
similar felonies which are aimed primarily at property, and the statute is not definitive
as to whether such claims will be valid. Change the facts only slightly, as by putting
the loot in the trunk of the car, and the claim becomes more readily recognizable,
for the auto is more clearly being employed for "part of the commission of another
criminal act." Even though these illustrations demonstrate the lack of precision in this
provision, the merits in providing compensation where possible are obvious.
"33. For a detailed analysis, see Lamborn, supra note 13, at 29.
34. Ch. 122,§ 1, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
35. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.020 (Supp. 1972).
36. Alternatively, the theory of comparative negligence might be employed to
determine if a victim was innocent within the meaning of the statute. See also note
38 and accompanying text infra.
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risk, such as when an innocent victim with obvious affluence wanders
into an area of a generally recognized high incidence of mugging and
robbery.
In addition, the statute specifically excludes compensation where
the criminal act was the result of "consent, provocation or incitement
by the victim. ' ' :37 This exclusion, distinct from the "innocent" victim
requirement, may cause difficult interpretive problems. The Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries appears to have substantial discretion in
determining whether the victim's conduct constituted the proscribed
"consent, provocation or incitement." The need for such discretion is
inherent in any compensation program since the factual determina-
tions will be difficult. Some authorities have suggested that the blame-
worthiness of the victim ought to be handled on a comparative basis,
reducing but not eliminating compensation in appropriate cases.38
Such an approach aggravates the difficulty of the factual determina-
tion, but it does offer an acceptable alternative to the "all or nothing"
approach of Washington.
Closely related to the issue of contributive conduct of the victim is
the issue of intrafamily crime, because of the difficulty of identifying
the offender and the innocent victim in such crimes and the possibility
of fraud and collusion. Yet, a flat exclusion of compensation to any
victim closely related to the offender is preordained to produce hard-
ship cases which merit compensation. The estranged wife and her
children hardly seem fitting objects of exclusion from a compensation
scheme when she is shot by a no-good husband who has not been sup-
porting the family. Nevertheless, the Act appears to exclude such vic-
tims by providing:3 1
In addition thereto, no person or spouse, child or dependent of such
person shall be entitled to benefits under this chapter when the injury
for which benefits are sought was the result of... an act or acts com-
mitted by a person residing with the victim or who is a spouse, child,
parent, or sibling of the victim by the half or whole blood, adoption or
marriage ....
The exclusion of intrafamily crime has political acceptability, but
37. Ch. 122, § 7(3). 11973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess.
38. See UNIFORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT § 5(f)(2) (Approved Draft
1973) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT].
39. Ch. 122, § 7(3), [ 1973] Wash. Laws. 1st Ex. Sess.
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one questions whether an absolute prohibition is the best solution. The
proposed Uniform Crime Victim Reparations Act would soften the
blow:40
Reparations may not be awarded to a claimant who is the offender
or an accomplice of the offender, nor to any claimant if the award
would unjustly benefit the offender or accomplice. [Unless the Board
determines that the interests of justice otherwise require in a particular
case, reparations may not be awarded to the spouse of, or a person
living in the same household with, the offender or his accomplice or to
the parent, child, brother, or sister of the offender or his accomplice.]
Without the bracketed language (and the presence of the brackets
means, in the style of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, that the language is optional), a near relative of
the perpetrator of the crime may be compensated. Yet, temptation to
inffict criminal injuries as a means of getting funds from the state is
inhibited by the provision against unjust enrichment. Even with the
bracketed language, which embodies the basic concept included in the
Washington Act, compensation may be awarded to relatives of an of-
fender when the interest of justice so requires. This approach seems
preferable to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.41
Sexual offenses outside the family relationship were not given spe-
cific attention by the draftsmen of the Act. Does a rape victim, for
example, sustain personal injury? And, to what extent, if any, is the
victim entitled to compensation? The analogy to workmen's compen-
sation fails to provide persuasive guidelines here, but some clues as to
a possible solution exist. First, while the Washington scheme does not
expressly exclude compensation for pain and suffering, the integration
of crime compensation with industrial insurance makes this exclusion
fairly certain.42 Because much of the impact of rape is emotional, sim-
ilar to pain and suffering, this type of damage presumably will not be
40. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 38, § 5(c).
41. Professor Paul Rothstein insisted on this need for awareness of the possibility
of overbroad exclusions; he served as consultant to the Committee of Comissioners
on Uniform State Laws which drafted the UNIFORM ACT. His view, fortunately,
prevailed. See Rothstein, State Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Injuries, 44
TEXAS L. REv. 38, 48-49 (1965).
42. The limited amounts of compensation, geared to earnings, earning capacity or
capacity generally do not reflect pain and suffering. Hawaii's program stands alone in
expressly extending coverage to pain and suffering, so it is not surprising that
Washington denies such compensation.
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compensable. However, neuroses may develop occasionally which
would seem to be compensable. 43
Second, a rape victim does not sustain personal injury in the phys-
ical sense that an assault victim does. Whether a resulting pregnancy
is within the ambit of that personal injury is not clear. Some states
have seen fit to define injury as inclusive of pregnancy resulting from
rape which ensures compensation for medical care incident to the
pregnancy and delivery of the baby, or perhaps an abortion.4 4 Even
without such detailed statutory provisions, however, such medical
costs ought to be compensable. Indeed, under the Washington Act,
loss of earnings due to pregnancy is arguably compensible.
45
The Act denies compensation to crime victims who are in jail or in
institutions maintained and operated by the Department of Social and
Health Services. 46 The combined effect of this exclusion and the pro-
visions of the Act which bar civil actions against the state poses an
issue of constitutional dimensions. The proposition that the state may
insulate itself from liability to this class of persons while denying
compensation under the otherwise available program is suspect and
could be challenged with an equal protection argument. 47  The ex-
clusion of these victims may not be a significant issue, however, since
such victims will already be under the state's care and thus will receive
free medical attention and will not suffer impairment of earnings.
However, since non-prisoners receive compensation which is not lim-
ited to medical attention, the fact that prisoners receive medical atten-
tion may not be sufficient to quell the claim of discrimination.
48
43. See Lamborn. supra iote 13. at 33-40.
44. Hawaii and New Jersey are illustrations. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 35 1-2 (1967):
N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:4B-2 (1971).
45. The loss of earnings would be a sine qua non and in effect limit this kind of
compensation to employed females. The reason is that temporary total disability is
expressly limited to persons gainfully employed. See Ch. 122. § 7(7), [19731 Wash.
Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
46. Id. § 7(3).
47. Indeed, of all the persons in society who may conceivably have a claim
against the state founded on the state's failure to take reasonable efforts to protect
against criminal acts, the inmates of institutions appear to have the strongest case.
The reason is not that jails harbor criminals, but that inmates are under the control
of the state with limited opportunity for self-defense and thus in greatest need of
protection.
48. Ch. 122, § 7. 119731 Wash. Laws. Ist Ex. Sess. A housewife who is not
gainfully employed is similarly not caused to sustain a loss of earnings when she is
injured in a criminal way, and yet she may obtain compensation not limited to
medical care.
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Further limitations or exclusions from compensation are in-
cluded in the procedural requirements of the statute. Claims not filed
within 180 days after an injury and within 120 days after death are
barred.49 The exception to these limitations is found in Section 16 of
the Act, which extends the right to compensation to persons injured
on or after January 1, 1972, if they file within 90 days from the effec-
tive date of the Act (January 1, 1974).50
There may be procedural details in the industrial insurance statute
which must be met by claimants under the Act, but only one appears
to be express: compensation may be denied to one who refuses to
submit to a medical examination. 5'
IV. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
The integration of Washington's crime victims' compensation into
industrial insurance is a significant contribution made by the
draftsmen of the Act and has the merit of keeping the two schemes
parallel, thus avoiding imbalance of payments.52 As a result, an em-
ployed worker will receive the same amount of compensation whether
he is injured during the course of a crime or while on-the-job.
The kinds of compensation available under industrial insurance
include medical attention, death benefits, permanent total disability
pensions, temporary disability compensation and permanent partial
disability payments, plus rehabilitation. The medical care to which an
employee is entitled is virtually without monetary limit,53 and this lim-
itless care will apply to crime victims also. 54 This approach is signifi-
cantly superior to any program which stipulates an arbitrary max-
49. Id. ch. 122, § 6.
50. Id. ch. 122. One Seattle resident in this category was an influential witness
during the hearings on the proposal for crime victims' compensation, and the com-
pulsion of her situation supplies the understandable base for this exception. The ex-
ception has been called the "'Pat Hemenway Amendment." Seattle Times, Sept. 30,
1973, at I. col. 1.
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.110 is expressly included in the new scheme, Ch. 122,
§ 10. [1973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess.
52. In addition to Washington, only Maryland and three Canadian provinces have
tied crime compensation into industrial insurance. See Lamborn, supra note 13, at
34. Other states mandate that compensation statutes other than criminal victims
statutes be used as guidelines. Id. at 45.
53. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.36.010 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
54. Ch. 122, § 8, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex.Sess.
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imum amount of compensation for medical payments to be paid to a
victim or his dependents. 55
Much of the compensation to which employed persons are entitled
under industrial insurance is, however, geared to their wages, and this
obviously creates special problems for the crime victims' compensa-
tion program because it is not limited to working people. In particu-
lar, industrial insurance payments for death56 and for total disability,
whether temporary57 or permanent 5 8 are based upon the wages
earned by the employee at the time of the industrial accident. Under
the new program, different bases are provided for determining the
amount of compensation for death and temporary or permanent total
disability when the victim is unemployed.
A. Death Benefits.
The amounts payable for burial will be the same under industrial
insurance and the new Act, but the compensation payable to survivors
is different. In the case of an on-the-job accident, the surviving spouse
is entitled under industrial insurance to receive monthly payments
based upon a percentage of the deceased employee's wages and the
number of children, but subject to certain established minimum and
maximum amounts. 5: The surviving spouse of a crime victim will re-
ceive the same amount if that victim was employed. However, if the
victim was not employed, the surviving spouse will receive a lump
sum payment of $7,500 "without reference to children."'" 0 Apparently
this means that children who are dependent upon the deceased have
no independent claim to compensation so long as a spouse survives. A
child receives compensation under the new plan only if there is no
surviving spouse, and that compensation is a lump sum payment of
$2,500 to each child."'1 The maximum amount payable under this
55. Lamborn, supra note 13. at 46-53.
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.050 (Supp. 1972).
57. Id. § 51.32.090.
58. Id. § 51.32.060.
59. Id. The new statute differentiates between employed and non-employed indi-
viduals in these terms: -victim who was not gainfully employed at the time of death.
and who was not so employed for at least three of the twelve months immediately
preceding injury." The proper interpretation is that unless both of these criteria are
met, the amount of compensation will be determined by the criteria for non-workmen.
Ch. 122. § 7(4). 119731 Wash. Laws. Ist Ex. Sess.
60. Ch. 122, § 7(4), [ 1973] Wash. Laws, lst Ex. Sess.
61. Id.
566
Vol. 49: 551, 1974
Crime Compensation
provision appears to be limited only by the procreative power of the
victim, for unlike the parallel provisions under industrial insurance,132
there is no stated maximum.
Arbitrarily established monetary awards are often difficult to jus-
tify. The payments to non-workers' survivors for criminally caused
death under the Washington Act seem particularly questionable be-
cause they were not established with any view toward actual mone-
tary loss. For example, the death of a housewife produces the same
award regardless of whether that housewife was an active housekeeper
and mother or an invalid who provided no household care and only
limited motherly attention. In most instances, the amount set by the
new Act appears to be unreasonably low, and yet in particular cases
the amount may be a windfall.
The Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act illustrates a different
method of awarding compensation. The Uniform Act seeks to provide
compensation for actual loss. In the case of the employed worker, that
loss is the economic contribution the worker would have provided the
dependent but for the death of the worker, less expenses the depen-
dent is saved by the death. In addition, the dependents of both em-
ployed and unemployed victims are compensated for the losses caused
by replacing the services the dependents would have received from the
deceased victim.63 While the Uniform Act fails to provide complete
reparations for actual loss, due to a suggested over-all maximum limit
of $50,000 on compensation, its method of determining awards by the
facts of each case rather than by an arbitrary lump sum nevertheless
seems preferable.
B. Temporary Total Disability.
The employed person who sustains a work-related accident receives
compensation under industrial insurance based on a percentage of his
wages with certain maxima and minima for that period during which he
is unable to work.64 Under the Act, the employed person who is in-
jured by a criminal will receive the same compensation, but the victim
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.050 (2), (3), (5) (Supp. 1972).
63. See UNIFORM AcT. supra note 38, § 1(g).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090 (Supp. 1972).
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who is not employed will receive no compensation for temporary inca-
pacity. 35
Again, the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act seems to have
a better solution to a very difficult problem. It simply is not true that a
housewife and her family sustain no pecuniary loss during the period
of her inability to perform her duties; by providing no compensation
the Washington statute has left an undesireable gap. Under the Uni-
form Act, on the other hand, "replacement services loss" would be
payable in instances of injuries to wives and mothers. This includes
"expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining ordinary and necessary
services in lieu of those the injured person would have performed, not
for income but for the benefit of himself or his family, if he had not
been injured.""" This solution seems more equitable than that of
denying all compensation to unemployed individuals who incur a
temporary loss of capacity.
C. Permanent Total Disability.
The injured worker who is permanently and totally disabled is
given a pension under industrial insurance geared to his wages at the
time of the industrial accident, but with minimum and maximum limi-
tations . 67 The employed person who is entitled to compensation as a
crime victim will receive the same amount. The unemployed person,
however, receives compensation based on the average monthly wage
paid in the state. The Act provides that in the case of victims who are
not gainfully employed and who are permanently totally disabled,
"'wages', for the purpose of calculation of benefits, where required,
shall be deemed to be the average monthly wage determined pursuant
to RCW 51.08.018 ....
The words, "shall be deemed to be," require clarification. They
may remove all discretion from the board and create an irrebutable
presumption as to the average monthly wage. A better interpretation is
that in any particular case, the board may decide that the set figure is
inappropriate. For instance, in the case of criminal injuries to a
person already totally disabled, compensation could be denied under
65. Ch. 122. § 7(7). [ 1973] Wash. Laws. Ist Ex. Sess.
66. See UNIFORM ACT. sutpra note 38. § l(g)(3).
67. WASH. REV. CoDE§ 51.32.060(Supp. 1972).
68. Ch. 122, § 7(5). [1973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess.
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this interpretation of the Act on the theory that the deeming of wages
to be the average in the state would be inconsistent with the physical
condition of the victim. A decision worthy of Solomon is involved,
though, where some disablement is caused by the injury but the extent
is not certain because the precise evidence needed (if any will do) to
establish refutation of the inapplicability of the average state wage is
unclear. The solution is not facilitated, incidentally, by the basic in-
dustrial insurance statute, because partial disability under that statute
is defined in terms of earning power, which is obviously neither actual
nor general capacity. 9 Again, the solution of the Uniform Act, which
attempts to specify the basis for compensation, seems clearer and
somewhat easier for an administrative agency to implement.70
D. Permanent Partial Disability.
For permanent partial disability, there is no need to differentiate
the employed from the unemployed victim for both are compensated
for impairment of capacity and not actual earnings. The Act specifies
compensation for certain losses for example, the loss of an eye), and
those losses not amenable to specific scheduling are to be ascertained
by a medical determination of impairment.
The impairment of capacity for which compensation is paid need
not be related to capacity to perform work, though it is doubtful
whether capacity to enjoy life is compensable as such. If there are
unsolved problems in this area of compensation, they are unresolved
both with respect to the worker and the nonworker, and the creation
of the crime compensation program does not inject new elements into
the picture.
E. Awards in general.
The objections noted by the author in the foregoing discussion
ought not be taken to mean that the new Washington Act is not a
wise, well drafted effort to meet a pressing social need. If the author
has demonstrated an overly jpartial view of the Uniform Crime Vic-
tims Reparations Act, the reason is that he had the honor to serve as
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090 (Supp. 1972).
70. See notes 59 and 62 and accompanying text supra.
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chairman of the national committee which drafted that Act and, thus,
has a certain pride of authorship. However, many details of the Wash-
ington Act, not alluded to herein, are excellent. For example, provi-
sions incorporated from the industrial insurance statutes respecting
lump sum and serial payments are praiseworthy. 7 While lump sum
payments often would tend to encourage prodigality, they may pro-
vide an immediate solution to a pressing financial problem which hin-
ders rehabilitation. A disabled person who desires to make an invest-
ment in a small venture, such as an in-home manufacturing process,
might find a lump sum payment essential to his adjustment to his disa-
bility. The Board should enjoy wide discretion in adjusting the type of
payments to the needs of the particular claimant.
V. CONCLUSION
Crime victims' compensation has been described as an idea "whose
time has come."' 72 There is no doubt that Washington's enactment
adds support to the movement, and many of its specific solutions to
difficult problems will be emulated elsewhere. The Washington Act
concededly has its limitations, yet the program is not merely a piece of
window dressing. 73 It will provide protection against losses due to per-
sonal injuries inflicted by criminal acts, but it will not, however, be a
cost-free undertaking. That some of the costs will be borne by the
criminals who inflict the injuries is a hope scarcely amounting to an
expectancy. 74 The true meaning of the new enactment is that criminal
acts are recognized as producing losses properly chargeable to society
as a whole. Washington is to be commended for having taken this
forward step.
71. See, e.g., Ch. 122. § 9. 119731 Wash. Laws. Ist Ex. Sess.. incorporating pro-
visions OfWASii. REV. CODE § 51.32.130 (1963).
72. United States Senator Mansfield has emphasized this point in a variety of ways.
See 117 CONG. REc. 46404 (1971).
73. Senator Tydings once described the California program as 'just public relations
surface treatment" (quoted by Lamborn. supra note 13, at 57).
74. The new Act does have provisions directing that ultimate liability fall on the
criminal in Section 12. Edelhertz and Geis will report that there have been few. if
any, recoveries under similar statutes in their study cited supra at note 25.
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